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THE TREASURY AND THE NEW CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL IN THE 1970s 
 
1. Introduction 
The 1970s and early 1980s saw the height of the Keynesian-monetarist controversy over 
economic policy. But for a while in the 1970s, Britain’s Treasury, still conventionally 
Keynesian at all but the most junior levels, faced a challenge that was more immediate and 
less avoidable than anything coming from Milton Friedman and his followers. The ‘natural 
rate of unemployment’ doctrine might nullify any permanent effects from demand 
management, but it did not of itself exclude attempts to smooth out fluctuations around the 
natural rate, or even to use monetary policy to cushion the effect of temporary changes in the 
natural rate (in the unlikely event of their being identified).  The New Cambridge School, by 
contrast, proclaimed short-term demand management as unsettling and unnecessary.  
Whatever their differences from Friedman they shared his fundamental assumption that it 
was over-active government, not private sector instability, that needed reining back to give a 
stable macroeconomic background against which the economy would save, invest and grow. 
        The Treasury was sceptical of this message and, as will be seen, some of its denizens 
would have liked to ignore it.  They could not.  For a while, the Times articles of Wynne 
Godley, Francis Cripps, Nicholas Kaldor and Robert Neild eclipsed even the monetarist 
journalism of Samuel Brittan and Peter Jay in the public attention they commanded.  When 
Labour returned to power in 1974, Kaldor and Godley were appointed special advisers to the 
Chancellor, Denis Healey, while Cripps became special adviser to Tony Benn, Industry 
Secretary and the Cabinet’s most thoroughgoing advocate of import controls – basically a 
Cambridge cause, albeit one which exposed some divisions in the Cambridge school.  The 
Parliamentary Committee on public expenditure summoned the Cambridge Economic Policy   3
Group and the Treasury and told them to start debating. At the end the committee persuaded 
the two sides to meet for a series of seminars.  And all the while, Treasury officials had the 
worry that their Chancellor, exposed almost daily to Cambridge ideas, might convert.  
        Although the figures identified as ‘New Cambridge School’ accepted the label, they 
made little use of it.  (Godley and Cripps preferred to talk of a new Cambridge model or a 
new Cambridge equation.)  Given the title was mainly bestowed by outsiders, there was 
inevitably imprecision as to exactly who and what it was supposed to cover.  But to list 
Nicholas Kaldor, Wynne Godley, Robert Neild and Francis Cripps as the most prominent 
members of the school would incur little dissent. The last three names also dominate the 
work of the Cambridge Economic Policy Group centred on the university’s Department of 
Applied Economics.  Kaldor was not an official member of this group and his name does not 
appear in its annual Economic Policy Review which started in 1975.  In what follows we shall 
use the designation ‘New Cambridge School’ when members of the CEPG were not 
explicitly speaking or writing on its behalf. 
        As regards sources, this article uses the release under the thirty-year rule of Treasury and 
Cabinet papers from the 1970s to look at the relationship between Cambridge and the 
Treasury inside as well as outside Whitehall.  Much of the internal debate ended in consensus 
– so much so that Michael Posner, a Cambridge don but a fierce critic of New Cambridge 
who was on secondment to the Treasury, accused one Treasury forecaster of being more new 
Cambridge than new Cambridge.  Indeed for a while the Treasury was far more open to a 
Keynesian – New Cambridge synthesis than a Keynesian-monetarist one. 
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2. Cambridge macroeconomics, 1972-4 
2.1 The Cambridge expenditure equation 
There had been agreement from the start as to what the essential new Cambridge message 
was.  It was that the marginal propensity to invest out of income approximately equalled the 
marginal propensity to save.  The private sector as a whole had a stable attitude to the net 
acquisition of financial assets (NAFA).  With the personal and corporate sectors aggregated 
in this fashion, New Cambridge made a positive virtue of their failure to distinguish between 
consumption and investment. (Cripps and Godley, 1976, p.335)  Private expenditure as a 
whole was a function of income and lagged income, the coefficients on these being expected 
to add up to unity and in fact very nearly doing so when estimated.  Initially the expenditure 
equation was cast in real terms. In 1975, for example, it was taking the form: 
 
PXt = 0.533(Y −T)t + 0.416(Y −T)t−1 + 0.899HP t + 0.790BAt + 0.962St  
(Treasury, 1975, p.3) 
PX = total private expenditure including fixed investment. Y-T = income after tax. HP = net 
increase in hire-purchase debt extended to the personal sector. BA = net increase in bank 
loans to the personal sector excluding loans for house purchases.  S = stockbuilding. 
        But the initial policy impetus came from the simplest version of the ‘stable NAFA’ 
proposition. 
If NAFA ≡ S − I , it follows that 
 S =  I , or given that I + G + X ≡ S +T + M  
 (G −T) =  (M − X) 
Changes in the current account will equal those in the budget deficit. 
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2.2 Cambridge advice 
With inflation and unemployment both on the rise, Edward Heath’s Conservative 
government, elected in June 1970, had followed only a mildly deflationary fiscal policy 
during its first year in office.  But in January 1972 unemployment reached one million for the 
first time since 1940.  The government’s response was to panic.  In March the Chancellor, 
Anthony Barber, brought in a budget whose declared aim was to raise real gdp by 10% 
between the first quarter of 1971 and the first quarter of 1973.  ‘I do not believe’ he said, ‘that 
a stimulus to demand of the order I propose will be inimical to the flight against 
inflation.’(Hansard, 21 March 1972, col 1353.) There was little opposition to the budget, the 
Economist even wondering if it had gone far enough. 
        Cambridge was an exception. Before the Barber boom had even properly got under way, 
the London and Cambridge Economic Bulletin (February 1972) had warned that simply 
reflating the economy to bring unemployment back down to half a million would produce an 
unsustainable trade deficit. (Coutts, 1977, p.91).   In November 1972 the government, 
alarmed by the conjunction of world commodity price rises and their own boom, brought in a 
90-day statutory wage and price freeze.  This was succeeded by the “£1 plus 4%” rule in 
which they steered a compromise between a flat rate pay limit and one which preserved 
relativities. In July 1973 Neild, writing in The Times, explicitly related the unemployment / 
current account tradeoff to the NAFA concept.  Given the size of the budget deficit, the boom 
in fixed investment and the upturn in stockbuilding, a tolerable balance of payments could be 
achieved only if vast corporate savings materialised.  Profits, he calculated, would have to be 
56% up on 1971 – something not only wildly unlikely to happen, but certain to wreck 
Heath’s incomes policy if it did. (Neild, 1973, p.27.) Meanwhile Godley and Cripps (1973b, 
p.21)  called for a reduction in consumption to reduce the trade deficit.  Since any fall in take   6
home pay would end the incomes policy, that left only credit controls.  Profits might not have 
risen fast enough to help the balance of payments, but they had risen fast enough to be 
another threat – via a ‘sense of unfairness’ – to the incomes policy.  Corporation tax should 
be raised.  Finally, Godley and Cripps called for import controls, though warning that unless 
they were ‘explained with extraordinary finesse, there could be bitter reactions’ from the 
U.S., GATT and the EEC. 
        In January 1974 Godley and Cripps (1974a, p.19) set out the fullest public statement yet 
of New Cambridge’s ideas. They started with a sharp attack on balance-of-payments fatalism 
– the current account, they said, was no harder to forecast than and control than the level of 
domestic economic activity.  Indeed their contention ‘that other than in the short term the 
private sector shows a small stable surplus’ implied that ‘the public sector’s budget deficit 
fully determines the balance of payments.’  This being so, ‘changes in exports, import prices 
etc., make a lot of difference to real income and output, but none at all to the balance of 
payments, however paradoxical.’   Hence fiscal policy should be used to determine the 
current account and ‘the budget deficit having been set in this way, success in achieving 
growth and full employment then depends on our ability to gain access to foreign markets 
and to commercial policy.’ 
        The statement that the budget determines the current account was interpreted by critics, 
reasonably enough, to mean that the former was exogenous and the latter endogenous.  This 
was obviously wrong. Even if NAFA is constant, the furthest it is possible to go is that fiscal 
initiatives will produce equal ex post changes in the budget deficit and the current account.  
Nor is it true, even in New Cambridge terms, that a shock to exports will leave the current 
account unaffected.  Certainly it will, like the tax change, have an identical ex post effect on   7
the budget deficit and the current account, but this effect will be zero only if the government 
neutralises the tax revenues coming in through increased export sales.  
        All this is uncontentious – no one from Cambridge has ever denied it. The Times article 
was simply carelessly worded and everyone took more care in future. (Cripps and Godley, 
1976, p.335) 
        In the meantime Heath’s incomes policy had gone on to a considerably less restrictive 
Stage 3.  Among its provisions was a system of ‘threshold payments’ whereby workers would 
get 40 pence a week (1% of the wage of the average worker) added to their pay for each 
percentage point rise beyond 8% in the retail price index in the 12 months from October 
1973.  It was meant to slow down inflation by removing the incentive for pre-emptive pay 
claims, but, coming in the very week that OPEC began its quadrupling of the price of oil, it 
could not have been worse timed.  The New Cambridge model, as will be seen later, made 
out the effects as even more baleful than the orthodox Treasury analysis did. 
        But even with threshold payments stage 3 was too restrictive for the National Union of 
Mineworkers who called first an overtime ban and then an all out strike.  Heath called an 
election to get a mandate to defend his policy and lost. On 7 March 1974, three days after 
Denis Healey’s appointment as Chancellor, Godley, Kaldor and Neild attended a budget 
strategy meeting at the Treasury. Kaldor called for a ‘more or less neutral budget’ (Treasury, 
1974a, p.3) but the main weight of argument came from the written submissions the 
economists sent in after the meeting.  Godley wanted both ‘a prolonged moratorium on living 
standards’ and a slow adjustment of the current account deficit (now running at £4 billion a 
year after the OPEC price rise.)  (T338/242, Godley to Healey, March [n.d.] 1974). The fact 
that even a slow adjustment ruled out any rise in living standards was a comment on the   8
extent of the problem. Kaldor reversed his advice at the meeting. There continued to be no 
strict economic case for deflation but 
 
         There is the ‘psychological aspect’ which one cannot ignore. The people know there 
         is a  crisis, and they are ready for belt-tightening measures; a second ‘mild budget’,    
        coming after Barber’s December effort, would make them feel that this is another  
        ‘popular’ budget in front of another election.  Also from the point of view of our     
        international credit it would not look good if a prospective borrowing requirement  
        of £3150m. were not reduced in the budget.  
        (T338/242 Kaldor to Healey, 9 March 1974, p.1) 
 
At a second meeting on the budget, Kaldor switched back to opposing higher taxes.  Instead 
the Chancellor should let consumption rise, ‘hope to get increased output later’ and borrow 
meanwhile. (Treasury, 1974b) 
        One can hardly blame Kaldor for being so uncertain what to do given the situation 
Labour had inherited: wage inflation running at over 20% following the collapse of Heath’s 
incomes policy, a projected current account deficit of £4 billion for 1974, and unemployment 
on the rise as forecasters differed only over the depth of the forthcoming recession.  There 
was, however, opposition to all the Cambridge advice from Sir Kenneth Berrill, the 
government’s Chief Economic Adviser. The Chancellor, he said, was getting advice on the 
basis of the New Cambridge proposition about NAFA and, although they had mercifully 
taken oil out of the equation and were basing their fiscal recommendations only on the non-
oil deficit, Healey ought to know that in the short term ‘the connection between the financial 
deficit of the public sector and the balance of payments is very weak.’ (T338/242, K.Berrill 
to Healey, ‘Outside Economic Advice’, 12 March 1974.)   9
        In the general election of February 1974, Labour had campaigned with promises of a 
‘Social Contract’ with the unions, whereby public spending increases and pro-union 
legislation on one side would be bartered for self-restraint on the other.  Most of the Treasury 
was sceptical from the start -- including Healey, who recalled in 2008 that he realised the 
Contract was not going to work ‘the moment I became Chancellor and we used to have 
meetings with the unions …  I realised almost immediately that the unions were worse than a 
waste of time because you couldn’t totally ignore what they were saying.’  (Lord Healey, 
pers. comm., 9 April 2008).  One implication of the Cambridge theories was that the 
Contract’s survival was extremely sensitive to the fiscal policy adopted – far more so than 
under orthodox Keynesian assumptions.  On Cambridge assumptions, government spending 
cuts might actually assist the Contract’s survival.  They would allow tax cuts without any net 
deterioration in the balance of payments, and tax cuts (indirect or direct) in New Cambridge’s 
view dented real wage resistance and thus tamed money wage claims.  The Treasury was 
sceptical.  In the first place they had to some extent signed up to the idea of the ‘social wage’ 
– the idea that workers and their unions took government spending into account when they 
decided how dissatisfied they were with their standard of living. (Castle, 1980, p.318)  Lower 
public spending with lower taxes might therefore just increase the private wage at the 
expense of the social one. Secondly, most Treasury economists were sceptical of the real 
wage resistance theory, and particularly of its implication that faster growth would reduce the 
rate of inflation. Finally, since the Treasury saw the link between the PSBR and the current 
account as much weaker than New Cambridge did, the whole idea of public spending cuts 
being required prior to tax cuts was much more conditional on circumstances. 
        By the end of 1974 Healey had had prolonged and thorough exposure to New 
Cambridge views.  But attempts to portray him as anything like a convert are unconvincing.    10
To Stewart (1978, p.193), Healey’s first budget, deflationary when the world was on the 
brink of the worst recession for 40 years, ‘seemed more like the action of a Conservative 
Chancellor in the 30s’ and was plainly under the influence of the New Cambridge proposition 
that the budget should be used on the balance of payments.  The trouble with this 
interpretation is that the budget was intended to be broadly neutral, and that no daylight can 
be discerned between Healey’s Cambridge and non-Cambridge advisers on this point.  Dell 
(1996, p.411) draws attention to the words of Healey’s budget speech of November 1974 – ‘a 
large balance of payments deficit is inevitable in the present circumstances and a large public 
sector deficit is the inevitable counterpart of this given that the private sector as a whole 
cannot be in substantial deficit without grave consequences.’  It is hard to think of a much 
less contentious statement, but to Dell this represented ‘the theory of inevitable equivalences’ 
which Healey held ‘due to his special adviser Nicholas Kaldor.’ (Dell, 1996, p.411) 
        A more accurate summary of Healey’s position came from Sir Douglas Wass, 
permanent secretary to the Treasury.  When he first came into office, said Wass, Healey 
 
    attach[ed] a great deal of importance to the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement  
  
   (PSBR),  not just for monetary purposes but more widely in regard to management  
 
    of the economy. He did not go so far as to embrace the New Cambridge School  
 
    thesis, but there were clear traces of their philosophy in his thinking. With the 
     
    passage of time the Chancellor has, I think, become somewhat dubious about 
   
    the PSBR as an indicator… (T338/246, D.W.G.Wass to Sir K.Berrill, ‘Public Sector  
 
   Borrowing Requirement etc.’, 8 August 1974) 
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3. The Public Expenditure Committee 
Healey was in fact so mildly infected with the New Cambridge virus that the rest of the 
Treasury might almost have been tempted to ignore it. The Commons Public Expenditure 
Committee had prevented them from doing so.  In May 1974 its chairman, Tory MP Michael 
Alison, set up an inquiry into the effect of public expenditure on the balance of payments.  
‘Essentially, the scope is provided by the propositions set out by Godley and Cripps in The 
Times  on 22 January 1974.’ (T338/334 Michael Alison, 22 May 1974) 
        Most Treasury officials were unenthusiastic. Patricia Brown, the under-secretary who 
oversaw Treasury forecasting, thought the committee was going well outside its remit, and 
asked how far it was likely to get, given that the Treasury would maintain its refusal to 
publish either its forecasts or the model on which they were based.  (T338/334, Brown to 
Chancellor’s PPS, 11 July 1974). P.N.Sedgwick, by contrast, thought that a frank discussion 
of the Treasury model would not only flatter the MP’s on the committee but distract their 
attention from the truly awkward questions: 
      
      It would be wise to pander to the members’ intellectual aspirations.  Put another  
 
      way, the longer the implications or properties of our model are discussed, and 
       
      compared with Mr Godley’s or Prof Laidler’s models, the less time there will 
 
       be for embarrassing questions on current policy or intentions.  A reading of  
       
       the transcripts will show that the hearings frequently take on the characteristics  
       
       of a tutorial as various members try to sort out puzzles in their own minds.  This  
 
       would be regarded as a fairly harmless way of killing time. (T338/274, Sedgwick 
 
      to Brown, 2 July 1974) 
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In the Treasury’s actual submission to the committee, the condescension remained but its 
point of application understandably switched: 
 
        It is laudable that a public committee should enquire into a pressing problem  
 
    of this nature and it serves admirably to force officials to focus their thoughts; 
 
    nevertheless it is regrettable that it should be done in the context of a doctrine 
 
    that has been presented primarily to the daily press and not in any reputable  
 
    academic journals … a prolonged attempt to elucidate and cope with the  
 
    implications of the unorthodox and rapidly changing Cambridge  doctrine may 
 
   be felt by some of us to be a misdirection of endeavour. (Treasury, 1974c, p.1) 
 
 
        Having got the dignified rebukes out of the way, the Treasury settled down to its attack 
on Wynne Godley. The accusations were, first, that he had accused the Treasury model of 
treating investment as exogenous, when in fact it was his own model which lacked any theory 
of investment at all – an omission which eviscerated his contention that shocks to the 
economy did not usually originate in the private sector. (ibid., p.15.)  He had represented 
fiscal policy as the only exogenous influence on the economy and yet held a theory of 
inflation where wages were exogenous. (ibid,, pp.25-26).  He had ignored evidence that the 
overseas sector was a major source of instability in the economy  -- despite the fact that his 
own model, with its relatively high value for the multiplier, predicted this instability would 
be worse than the Treasury model did.  (ibid., pp.29-30; Spencer and Mowl, 1974, p.2) As for 
the ‘stable NAFA’ proposition at the heart of New Cambridge, the aggregate figure did seem 
to lend it some credence, but concealed the instability of the corporate component. 
(T338/274, ‘Draft from Honor Stamler’. 28 June 1974, p.4)   It had, in any case, been fatally   13
weakened by Godley’s recantation of the doctrine that the marginal propensity to spend was 
unity, which alone was enough to bring down ‘what Kahn and Posner somewhat charitably 
described as “the elegant paradoxes of the New Cambridge School”.’(Treasury, 1974c, p.23) 
In sum Godley had 
    
      … a highly aggregated relationship between disposable income and expenditure,  
       
     that does not purport to describe behaviour directly or even say what behavioural  
 
    patterns underlay it, and is  not supported by empirical work on individual  
 
    relationships.  (ibid, p.20) 
 
 
All these charges were levelled before Godley and Martin Fetherston had actually appeared 
before the Committee, and some of them bore little relation to what they went on to say. 
Fetherston denied that they had ever said the budget deficit was the only determinant of the 
current account. (House of Commons, 1974, p.5)  Godley stressed the difficulty of 
forecasting what the budget deficit was going to be.   There could always be ‘new exogenous 
shocks … exports can rise or fall a lot which is going to change the tax yield.’ (ibid., p.7) 
They had always known that NAFA could vary substantially from year to year, and indeed 
accepted both David Laidler’s point that any stability in NAFA might proceed from 
‘accommodating monetary policy’, and that a lot of the time the respective changes in NAFA 
of the personal and the company sector had cancelled out, for reasons no one had explained. 
(ibid., p.9 & p.4) 
      But none of these concessions, Godley and Featherston argued, provided one iota of 
rehabilitation for the short-term discretionary fiscal policy to which the Treasury remained 
wedded.  The Committee’s report agreed with them: demand management over the last 20   14
years had been ‘extremely poor’, a view contested only by the Treasury and the Bank of 
England, ‘and they could hardly be expected to [agree].’ (House of Commons, 1974b, p.xix)       
        The report then collapsed: 
 
 
          We do not feel capable of making judgments on the efficacy of the Godley 
 
          hypothesis and the performance of Mr Godley’s model relative to the  
 
         behaviour of rival models (ibid., p.xvi) 
 
 
The trouble was that that was exactly what they had set themselves up to do. Any sense of 
Schadenfreude felt by the Treasury would have intensified after they read ‘We are not experts 
and do not claim to be.’  (ibid., p.xxi)  The main recommendations were, first, that people 
should not talk about inflation when they meant reflation and, second, that there should be 
Treasury / New Cambridge seminars though ‘the Treasury might not want to organise them.’ 
(ibid., p.xvii) 
 
4. Development of the Cambridge model 
But the Treasury did eventually organise them, and the seminars got under way in the 
summer of 1975. The Cambridge expenditure equation was now undergoing an important 
change: it had been recast, and would shortly be re-estimated, in money not real terms.  As its 
creators pointed out, this would have been the logical thing to do all along: lagged income, 
like everything else, should be deflated by the current price level, not a lagged one, in order 
to find out its effect on current spending.  But the improvement excited little applause from 
the Treasury.  Patricia Brown pointed out that you would simply have a new set of problems 
if, as was likely, ‘different components of expenditure were differentially sensitive to   15
inflation.’ (Treasury, 1975, p.7).  Nor could she agree with Godley’s proposition that the 
Cambridge formula left less of a role for short-term forecasting.  On the contrary, she said, 
the shortness of the lag in the Cambridge picture required that more effort be put into short-
term forecasting, while the centrality of bank lending and hire-purchase expenditure called 
for some ‘sophisticated flow-of-funds forecasting’ which the Treasury currently lacked and 
needed to develop. (ibid., p.31) 
        Finally Brown argued that the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s had made life harder for New 
Cambridge and ‘conventional’ forecasters alike.  Not only might inflation and employment 
uncertainties deter expenditure in the future, inflation had already led to a personal savings 
ratio of 7% over the past few years as savers tried to replenish their depreciated funds. (4% 
had been the maximum between 1963 and 1973.) (Treasury, 1975, pp.17-18)  Deflating 
lagged income by current prices, as Cambridge was now proposing, could not deal with this 
inflation tax effect, for the simple reason that neither the level of funds to be replenished nor 
the attrition of their value due to inflation was anywhere in the equation.  
         Nonetheless the Treasury’s verdict on New Cambridge was less aggressively negative 
than it had been the previous year.  They had, after all, found, an aggregate relationship 
between private sector income and private sector expenditure which other forecasters had 
failed to notice.  But, the Treasury’s report concluded, ‘the empirical evidence provided by 
New Cambridge does not support much of the argument derived from it, and is at best 
consistent with rather than a confirmation of the mechanism suggested.’ (ibid., p.20). 
        Treasury criticisms, together with those made by J.A.Bispham (1975) in the National 
Institute Economic Review were answered by Cripps, Fetherston and Godley in their article 
‘What is Left of New Cambridge?’  This appeared in the Cambridge Economic Policy 
Review, March 1976. The article first took up the charge that the Cambridge income-  16
expenditure equation had ‘insufficient theoretical underpinning to be convincing.’ (Cripps, 
Fetherston and Godley, 1976, p.47).  Cripps et. al. conceded something to this charge in their 
statement that aggregate NAFA ‘comprises so many separate elements that it cannot be 
thought of en bloc in behavioural terms: therefore much empirical work on component 
relationships needs to be done.’ (ibid., p.47n.) They did, however, reiterate the point that 
unless the marginal propensity to invest were set equal to the marginal propensity to save, 
then a step change in the flow of income would lead to an unending change in the stocks of 
financial assets held by persons and companies.  ‘It is precisely this implication, built into 
most conventional forecasting models, to which we object.’ (ibid., p.47) 
        The second charge was that the CEPG had neglected stockbuilding and shocks to 
imports and exports as exogenous sources of fluctuations.  Yes, said the article, they had, but 
so what?  The omission had led to no policy mistakes since it would be impossible to use 
fiscal policy to correct shocks to stockbuilding (too shortlived and hard to predict) or shocks 
to imports or exports (because whatever stabilised output would further destabilise the 
current account.) (ibid., p.47) 
        Finally there was the allegation that ‘the experience of the period since 1972 has been 
such as to destroy the equation originally put forward.’  Again, said the article, the issue was 
whether destroying the equation, if indeed it had been destroyed, did anything to rehabilitate 
fine tuning.  As Bispham said, the equation’s errors were down to unpredictable changes in 
stocks. But these were most likely due to the unprecedented level of, and variability in, 
inflation that the economy had suffered since 1973.  Recasting the Cambridge equation in 
nominal terms would link stockbuilding to inflation.  In fact this had now been done, and the 
prediction errors for 1973 and 1974 were very much less.  The key table is reproduced here: 
   17
Prediction errors (total private expenditure: £ million at current prices   


































(Cripps, Fetherston and Godley, 1976, p.47) 
 
       The main Treasury reaction to the article came from Andrew Britton, in a paper which 
limited itself to alleging that the proposition that ex post changes in the current account 
would match those in the PSBR ‘holds only as a very rough approximation indeed according 
to the Treasury model at least.’   Extraordinarily, even this was too much for Honor Stamler, 
who told Britton ‘I believe it is a mistake to sneer at the New Cambridge propositions.’ 
Posner meanwhile told Britton he was looking increasingly New Cambridge himself.  Britton 
had pointed out that, although particular changes in government spending and taxation 
produced very different effects on the PSBR and the balance of payments, when you added 
up the effects of these changes, the PSBR and current account effects were almost identical. 
When he called this ‘fortuitous’, Posner asked him if he was sure about this.  ‘I am not the 
only one, I am sure, who has been struck by the very New Cambridge nature of the 
[Treasury] model simulations in the medium term.’ (1) 
        Indeed the Treasury (at least as represented by Britton) was in danger of becoming more 
new Cambridge than new Cambridge, who had sounded a further retreat in their 1976   18
Economic Policy Review. This brushed off the contention that the whole Cambridge picture 
had collapsed when the public sector and current account deficits had moved so sharply in 
opposite directions.   This outcome, the Review  explained, ‘was entirely due to short-term 
influences’ (abnormally high private saving, heavy de-stocking and the impact effect of an 
improvement in the terms of trade.) (CEPG, 1976, p.8) Yet these were just the things that had 
initially been proclaimed not  to get in the way of a stable NAFA and hence a stable ex post 
relationship between the two deficits.   
        In July 1976 Kaldor returned to the theme that NAFA was currently abnormally high 
and that its reversion to a more usual value would worsen the tradeoff between the PSBR and 
the current account, which meant the former needed to be cut sharply and immediately.  His 
pessimistic view on the balance of payments, he said, ‘has not been shaken by the fact that I 
have been consistently wrong in prophesying balance-of-payments doom ever since the 
budget of Autumn 1974.’ The intervening period, Kaldor said, had been one of recession in 
which ‘ “New Cambridge” does not hold.’  Pessimistic animal spirits had broken the link 
between savings and investment. 
 
 
      But we cannot count on this as a lasting factor.  I am convinced, therefore, that  
 
      sooner or later I shall be proved right; and if this is the case, we would 
 
       be taking unnecessary risks by delaying action until these are justified by  
 
      the expansion of home demand. (T364/17 Kaldor to Wass, 1 July 1976, p.3)) 
 
 
But cutting the PSBR, Kaldor continued, was not enough in itself, there also needed to be 
direct action on the balance of payments with import deposits (more on this later.) 
   19
        The CEPG’s 1977 review divorced the two deficits further, concluding on this basis that 
fiscal policy since 1974 had been ‘about right’ but ‘largely by mistake.’  In particular the 
Labour government’s deficits between 1974 and 1976 
 
    … now look to have been appropriate, mainly because the rise in personal savings 
 
     and large-scale destocking provided an unexpectedly large deflationary impulse 
 
      which the budget deficits served to offset (CEPG, 1977, p.5) 
 
 
It is hard to translate this as anything but ‘it’s lucky they didn’t listen to us.’ 
 
5. The real wage resistance theory of inflation 
But if New Cambridge’s fiscal recommendations had lost their sharp edge, other theories had 
been developed which led to increasingly radical criticism of what the Treasury was doing. 
Some of the New Cambridge policy proposals stemmed from their distinctive view of 
inflation.  Successive Policy Reviews stated their position unambiguously: deflation made 
inflation worse.  (CEPG, 1975, p.13, 1976, p.2; 1977, p.6; see Cripps (1977) for the most 
comprehensive argument.) This is because price inflation follows wage inflation, which is 
driven by the gap between workers’ actual and target real wages.  So far as ‘counter-
inflationary’ fiscal and monetary policy damages productivity, the real wage is held down 
and money wage inflation gets worse. 
    This ‘real wage resistance’ theory of inflation had come to enjoy some support in the 
Treasury too, though the official who said it was now ‘the Treasury orthodoxy’ was 
exaggerating (2). What distinguished New Cambridge from anyone in the Treasury was their 
assumption that any wage increase would be passed on in prices, irrespective of the state of   20
demand.  This stemmed from their Normal Price Hypothesis, which said that prices were 
formed on the basis of costs regardless of the state of the business cycle (Godley and 
Nordhaus, 1972)  And it was why Healey’s Cambridge advisers regarded Heath’s threshold 
payments (see above, p.7) with even greater horror than the Treasury did.  But, as Kaldor told 
Healey, the threshold payments were there and could not be abolished or watered down 
without terrible union resistance.  So the best thing would be that ‘threshold payments should 
be met by the Exchequer, and not by the individual employer.’ (T338/242 Kaldor to Healey, 
9 March 1974, p.2)  Kaldor then said that, as long as the threshold payments lasted, the Price 
Commission ‘would have to be instructed’ not to allow threshold-induced wage increases to 
be passed on as prices. (Treasury, 1974b, pp.2-3)  Healey said ‘he would wish to reflect on 
this’ (ibid.p.3); Patricia Brown sent him ‘a dampener’ on the idea (ibid, p.3, note in margin) – 
justifiably, given that even the existing Price Code, whereby firms could pass on up to half 
the wage increases they were paying, would by the autumn produce the worst corporate 
liquidity crisis for 40 years and bring a swathe of industry to near-bankruptcy. Kaldor’s hope 
that his proposal would force firms to find productivity gains – with the bonus that workers 
could be ‘released’ from the service sector into manufacturing  (ibid, p.3) -– sounds distinctly 
utopian in the light of what actually happened. 
    And by the end of 1974 further ground was opening up between Cambridge and the 
Treasury on inflation. The former were sticking by the real wage resistance theory more 
emphatically than ever: the latter, mostly, had swung round to the view that unemployment 
was not a cause of inflation but, if no other remedy could be found, would have to be used as 
a cure. In the words of Sir Bryan Hopkin, recently appointed Chief Economic Adviser: 
 
    To check inflation by operating on demand is of course a barbarous and    21
     
    wasteful method of achieving the objective.  It is only justifiable if as a community  
     
    we are insufficiently enlightened or have insufficient sense of community interest  
    
    to accept restraint on the pursuit of individual or group money incomes, which ever  
     
    is the alternative.  Nevertheless, realism forces one to admit that the degree of  
     
    enlightenment is inadequate.  (T338/262, W.A.B.Hopkin, ‘Inflation: Where Next?’, 4  
 
   December 1974, p.1) 
 
 
But by now, as far as the Treasury was concerned, all the other Cambridge policies were a 
little-regarded sideshow beside their advocacy of import controls. 
 
6. Import controls 
Godley and Cripps (1973a, p.17) had called for consideration of import controls back in 
January 1973. The problem was how to secure restraint of consumption (needed to keep the 
current account acceptable) without cutting real wages (which would wreck the current 
incomes policy whereby workers were to get no more than ‘£1 + 4%.’).  But after this the 
profile of import restraint waned for a while.  In ‘Payments Deficit: The Strategic Options’ 
published in The Times a year later, the only reference to import controls is that they ‘would 
be likely to provoke retaliation, particularly because at the present time other industrial 
countries also face large trade deficits.’  (Godley and Cripps, 1974b, p.19)  The OPEC price 
rise had intervened. 
        Treasury officials expected import controls to be on a Labour government’s agenda, at 
least for possible consideration. On 1 March 1974, the day after the general election, and 
before Heath had even resigned, they judged direct action on imports ‘attractive’, insofar as   22
bringing imports down by tighter macroeconomic policy involved taxes rising ‘perhaps four 
times the import saving sought.’  (PREM 16/707, ‘Note by officials’, 1 March 1974, p.1)  
        But the note went on to turn import controls down for the usual reasons (they would 
distort resource allocation, probably involve leaving the EEC, and provoke a tidal wave of 
imports in the inevitable period between announcement and implementation.) Healey, the 
new Chancellor, wanted to keep the option open, but not to do any preparatory work on it, 
which would ‘increase the risk of leak.’ (3) 
        There the matter largely rested until Healey called a meeting on the subject in December 
1974. Discussion centred on the prospects for getting away with controls without provoking 
retaliation or too much international hostility.  A few days later Healey commissioned a 
Treasury paper on import restraints. Its author, Mary Hedley-Miller, pointedly contrasted ‘the 
attraction’ with ‘arguments against’ (and said the latter were conclusive before she even spelt 
them out.)  Simultaneously Kaldor was agreeing with Hopkin that ‘if we can do without 
import restrictions this would be much better.’  His preferred policy towards the balance of 
payments was now a dual exchange rate system, with a more competitive pound for exporters 
and importers of manufactures. (This would be achieved by crediting the former and debiting 
the latter with an amount of sterling equal to the difference between the two rates of 
exchange.) However Kaldor also spelt out the circumstances in which this would not be 
enough, and import quotas required: ‘What if the whole of British industry is threatened with 
collapse?.. what else could we do?’  As for retaliation ‘I do not see what the Germans could 
reasonably do if we cut off unnecessary imports like motor-cars, television sets and many 
other things ... over a longer period we must bring our trade with other manufacturing 
exporters into a state of balance.’ (4)   
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        In February 1975 Industry Secretary Tony Benn made his first push at Cabinet level for 
import controls. (CAB134/3929, Benn to Ministerial Economic Strategy Committee, ‘A 
Choice of Economic Policies, 11 February 1975.) The same month Wass sent a paper to the 
Chancellor which looked at a number of options for improving the current account.  
Quantitiative import controls were quickly ruled out. But Wass told Healey that the Treasury 
‘with one or two exceptions’ preferred an import surcharge to doing nothing, especially as it 
would necessitate even larger cuts in public borrowing than the ones the Chancellor ought to 
be bringing in anyway. (This was because an import surcharge on its own would not only add 
to domestic demand at the wrong moment, but debar the ‘grudging acquiescence’ he thought 
our ‘major partners’ would give the scheme ‘if they were satisfied we were doing something 
about borrowing.’) (Wass, 2008, pp.96-7) 
        Wass had also opposed a managed depreciation of sterling – indeed doubted if it were 
feasible – but by the summer of 1975, as a temporary improvement in the current account 
started to go into reverse, the Treasury was changing its mind. H.H.Liesner, at Hopkin’s 
request, compared this option with different types of import control, coming down on the side 
of devaluation and claiming that the CEPG case for import controls had nothing to do with 
their income-expenditure model but rested on their pessimism as to what a falling pound 
would do to inflation. Replying, Kaldor and Godley went no further than saying that it ‘may 
be necessary to resort to schemes which embody some element of protectionism such as a 
revenue-neutral tax-subsidy scheme.’ This was preferable to ‘import quotas or import 
deposits which reduce the propensity to import without helping exports.’  They turned down 
depreciation, both because of the inflationary consequences, and because the devaluation of a 
floating currency could be neither planned nor managed.  But over the summer of 1975 
Kaldor and Godley moved to a much more decisive position.  In July Kaldor restated his anti-  24
devaluation arguments, adding that by now the pound had in any case fallen enough to rule 
out price factors as the cause of poor export performance.  The trouble, rather, was that ‘we 
are not capable of producing up-to-date products with the design and quality required.’ With 
further depreciation not a useful option, the balance of payments would remain the barrier to 
full employment until industry was modernised.  But this in itself would require ‘large 
imports of machinery of a kind that we are not at present able to produce at home.’  All the 
more reason, therefore, to restrict inessential imports to make room for the essential ones. (5) 
        Godley agreed: ‘there is no exchange rate that will solve our problems’, which perforce 
drove policy back on ‘special measures’ to restrict imports. (T277/3057, Godley, ‘Methods to 
Improve the Balance of Payments, 30 July 1975, p.4)  Hopkin agreed with Kaldor and 
Godley that Britain needed ‘big policy changes designed to raise the efficiency and 
progressivity of our productive machine.’ But the villain was not free trade; rather it was a 
state of affairs ‘in which commercial enterprise enjoys neither appreciation nor reward, in 
which the mobility of resources is impeded and in which practices hostile to technological 
improvement and favourable to inflation are permitted and encouraged.’ Many changes were 
possible in ‘taxation, price control, industrial relations, housing policy and social security 
arrangements’: should public opinion get in the way of these reforms, Britain might have to 
‘fall back on Lord Kaldor’s protectionism as the lesser evil. But ... it would be a pretty 
miserable prospect.’ (T338/345, Hopkin to Wass, ‘Economic Strategy, 19 September 1975, 
p.1) 
        Except for the last bit, Hopkin’s diagnosis and prescription could have come straight 
from Mrs Thatcher. This did not stop Kaldor agreeing with much of it, but he thought 
Hopkin’s reforms needed a ‘favourable economic environment’ where firms thought 
investment worthwhile and workers could be confident that less overmanning and restrictive   25
practices did not simply mean more unemployment. For this reason import restrictions ‘may 
be needed not as a “last resort”, but as a precondition for a programme of reform.’ (T338/345, 
Kaldor to Wass, ‘Economic Strategy’, 22 September 1975).  On this manifesto Hopkin wrote 
‘No further action (in case go on for ever!)’. 
        In October 1975 the first Treasury minister jumped ship and came out for import 
controls.  Denzil Davies, a Minister of State, told Healey ‘However unpalatable, it seems to 
me that both the political and economic considerations point emphatically in favour of 
Generalised Trade Restrictions.’ Healey himself had now been converted to the case for 
limited selective import restraints, and sank his differences with Peter Shore, the Trade 
Secretary and a convinced supporter of import quotas, to co-author a Cabinet paper on the 
subject. Quotas were introduced in December to cover all of 0.16% of Britain’s total imports.   
(6) 
        Meanwhile Kaldor was getting into another debate with the Treasury, this time about the 
efficacy of devaluation.  When Kaldor presented many pages of country-by-country 
statistical tables and picked out numerous countries which had devalued and done themselves 
no good, A.J.C.Edwards of the Treasury weighed in, insisting that multiple regression must 
be used -- as in the Treasury model, which showed devaluation to be effective.   Kaldor 
retorted that the Treasury model had been used to do something very different and much less 
useful  -- namely to derive price elasticities on the basis of time-series evidence for the UK 
alone.  His was an international cross-section study which showed there were long-term 
differences between countries’ export performance which exchange rate changes did nothing 
to address.  In any case, time series analyses like that of the Treasury were exceptionally 
sensitive to the data and assumptions used – the CEPG had performed the same exercise and 
reached an opposite conclusion. Hopkin intervened to pour cold water on both time-series   26
and cross-section studies of the exchange rate effect but gave judgement against Kaldor, 
whose work was 
 
     extremely crude and over-simplified. It takes no account of lags; none of the  
 
     effects of divergent experience of different countries, in regard to levels of  
 
     activity; and none of the structural differences of national behaviour in the face  
 
     of trade opportunities.  
 
 
Treasury studies showed this last factor (measured by elasticity of exports with respect to 
world trade) was especially important.  This, said Hopkin, might seem like a victory for 
Kaldor, but ‘for a country like the UK, facing various adverse structural factors which are 
difficult to influence, it is an important consideration that changing competitiveness is one of 
the few ways of influencing trade flows.’  (7) 
        It sounds like a draw, which is maybe why both sides moved on at this point.  At a 
meeting of the Policy Co-ordinating Committee in February, ‘all’ (Kaldor was there) wanted 
the exchange rate to fall, though divisions emerged over the size of the fall, and on how, 
indeed if, it could be managed. At the Ministerial Economic Strategy Committee in March, 
Shore proposed a reflationary policy to bring down unemployment, damage to the current 
account being contained by controls which would hold imports of consumer goods and some 
semi-manufactures at their 1975 level until 1980. Foreign critics would be told that any 
solution to Britain’s problems would involve holding down imports one way or another. (8) 
        Healey vigorously opposed Shore’s scheme and the Committee rejected it.  But the 
Treasury’s March Medium-Term Economic Assessment was far more sombre than anything 
so far. It predicted that bringing unemployment down to 3% by 1980 would involve a current   27
account deficit of £10 billion.   This led to another interdepartmental inquiry, this time to 
look at ‘a medium term protectionist strategy’, not temporary tide-over expedients.  The 
inquiry stayed close to the macroeconomics, avoiding, in particular, getting into the argument 
over whether British industry would wilt under the featherbedding or re-equip itself behind 
the wind-break.  They found the Shore scheme could produce a fall in unemployment of 
about 200,000 by 1980.  However they worried what would happen after 1980 (assuming the 
scheme was taken off by then), and ruled the idea out on the usual grounds of the 
international repercussions. (9) 
        Kaldor was part of Wass’s Short-Term Policy Group which endorsed the report.  In 
particular, he did not think ‘we could get away with an import standstill.’  He also wanted the 
Chancellor to ‘emphasise that the case for a scheme of this sort is now much weaker because,  
with our improved competitiveness, he is hoping to obtain satisfactory output and 
employment targets without import restraints.’ (T389/23 Kaldor to Healey, ‘Import 
Restraints, 27 May 1976, p.2)    Depreciation was working after all. 
   
       Or was it?  The surprising thing is that Kaldor did not sound any kind of inflationary 
alarm, still less (given his continued adherence to the Cambridge theory) warn of what might 
happen to wage demands via the real income effect.   But the further fall in the pound in the 
autumn of 1976 (it touched $1.57 in October and was widely predicted to go below $1.50) 
had Kaldor worrying about imminent hyperinflation, not least through the channel of falling 
real wages (Thirlwall, 1987, p.253.)   In the meantime, he fired off to Healey a succession of 
increasingly desperate remedies for the dire state of current account /unemployment tradeoff  
-- remedies which, he hoped, might also avoid an IMF loan and the consequent end of all 
possibility of import restrictions. Kaldor proposed a £1 billion cut in public spending, a 5%   28
payroll tax, a car tax surcharge, a marginal employment subsidy, further controls on capital 
exports and an import deposit scheme whereby those importing manufactures would place 
200% of their value at the Bank of England for 12 months.  The Treasury made the £1 billion 
cut, briefly considered a much smaller import deposit scheme and ignored the other 
proposals. Kaldor had by now had enough, and in August 1976 he resigned from the 
Treasury. (ibid., pp.252-4) 
        Kaldor was right about real wages, if not about consequent hyperinflation. Thanks to the 
combination of the falling pound and Labour’s £6-a-week limit on pay increases (introduced 
in July 1975), real wages fell faster in 1976-7 than at any time since 1945, Healey actually 
boasting to the Cabinet that by the late summer of 1977 they would be down by 7%. Some of 
his colleagues, to put it mildly, saw this figure less positively.  Tony Benn used it in his 
argument for a much bigger scheme than Shore’s involving a 30% tariff on all imports of 
manufactures.  Healey repeatedly warned Benn that his policies would require as much 
deflation as any of the alternatives if they were to work, invoking the Cambridge School’s 
authority for this.   (Presumably he meant that a given improvement in the current account, 
however achieved, required a given cut in the PSBR to make it work.) The final time he did 
so was under the shadow of the IMF negotiations, as officials worked on contingency plans 
‘on a possible scheme of import restraints’ in the event of breakdown.  In a meeting in 
October it was even suggested (probably by Healey, though the remark is unattributed) that 
Benn’s ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ would involve more deflation than any other option. 
(10)  It is hard to see how anyone arrived at this conclusion, and surprising that the record 
does not show Benn challenging it.     
 
   29
7. IMF crisis and after 
As the government approached and then survived the IMF crisis of December 1976, the 
imports issue became the sole focus of the Treasury’s disagreement with the CEPG.  This is 
understandable.  But the other disagreements between the two institutions had in any case 
waned.  Away from the question of protection, the Cambridge macroeconomic position had 
shrunk to little more than an embargo on fine tuning, and even this was watered down by 
their revisionist contention that in the short run NAFA was both variable and sometimes 
unpredictable. The Treasury was meeting the CEPG at least half way, as it retreated from 
active short-term demand management.  One reason was that the ‘natural rate of 
unemployment’ doctrine had become uncontentious to many of the younger economists.  In 
December 1975 the ‘Steering Group on the Development of the [Forecasting] Model” had 
actually voted on whether the long-run Phillips curve was vertical and decided by a majority 
that it was. (11) It is thus hard to support Mosley’s (1984) characterisation of the Cambridge 
School as a ‘Trojan horse’ for monetarism. Mosley claims that Cambridge’s leftish political 
orientation made its hands-off message more palatable to the Labour government than 
doctrines associated with Enoch Powell and Sir Keith Joseph. But by 1976 Cambridge was 
barely more ‘hands-off’ than the Treasury itself.  The two institutions had met in the middle.  
And, while Treasury papers for the period show some intellectual resistance to any challenge 
to Keynesianism – how else, indeed, could they do the ‘normal science’ expected of them? – 
it seems likely that it was professional rather than ideological baggage that officials were 
loath to shed, even supposing that they found Cambridge more ideologically sympathetic 
than Chicago in the first place. 
        But certainly there was a huge contrast between the Treasury’s tone in 1974, when any 
engagement with the NCS appeared to be seen as a form of intellectual slumming, and 1976   30
when a mild glancing criticism of the CEPG could have the critic rebuked for ‘sneering.’ 
Because the focus of this article has been on Cambridge and the Treasury, it has dealt rather 
briefly with non-Treasury ministers.  In particular much more could be said about Tony 
Benn’s campaign for import controls.  Given that (as both men confirm) Benn’s views can be 
taken as a reliable indicator of those of Francis Cripps, the division between the CEPG and 
Kaldor can only widen. (12)  In the end Britain managed without import restrictions – had to, 
as part of the price of the IMF loan – and 1977 and 1978 saw falling inflation and a halving 
of the PSBR.   But unemployment fell only slightly, staying above 1 ¼ million, and the 
Cambridge message continued to be that current policies could not get past the balance-of-
payments constraint on full employment and the only solution was protection by means of 
import controls. (CEPG, 1977, p.10)  And the recession of the early 1980s was just around 
the corner.  Then, as manufacturing output shrank by one-sixth in a single year, and 
unemployment passed two and a half million on its way to its eventual peak of more than 
three, the Left’s Alternative Economic Strategy – a macroeconomic if not always a 
microeconomic descendant of the CEPG – emerged as the most coherent of the alternatives 
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